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LONG v. EGNOR: REEXAMINING THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.'
Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation. The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of
the essential dignity and worth of2 every human being a concept at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty.
Since the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 the law
regarding defamation of a public official has been a struggle of constitutional dimension between an individual's right to reputation and society's interest in the
freedom of political speech. 4 In Long v. Egnor, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals reviewed this balance, focusing specifically on what language is defamatory. The Court took this opportunity to refine its definition of defamation of
a public official and to further its strong commitment to the right of free speech.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The factual scenario developed in this case is brief. Bill Long, a West Virginia
Education Association (hereinafter "WVEA") employee responsible for representing
WVEA members in administative hearings, circulated a memorandum to some WVEA
members which stated in part:
It has been reported to me that a member of the Cabell County Board of Education
has allegedly visited job locations in Cabell County to tell our ESP members that
the administration and Board will systematically deny all grievances filed by any
ESP member. Furthermore, this Board member has allegedly stated that anyone
who files a grievance ought to be fired.
If any of these reported events did occur, they would be in violation of in-

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1969).
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stuart, J., concurring).
INew York Times Co., 376 U.S. 354.
4 Comment, The High Cost of Free Speech: ProposedRelief for Defendants in Political Defamation Cases, 3 CooLaY L. REv. 361, 362 (1985).
2
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dividual and organizational Constitutional rights and also in violation of West Vir5
ginia State Law. (emphasis in original).
The Board members filed a libel action against the WVEA claiming that the
memorandum was false, demeaning and libelous per se. In particular, the memorandum was alleged to have imputed that the members were unfit to perform
their official duties, suggested a lack of integrity in their official conduct, and
prejudiced them in the discharge of their official duties. 6 The complaint also contained a claim under West Virginia's insulting words statute, W. Va. Code section
55-7-2.7 The Board members demanded $500,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,500,000 in punitive damages.8
The WVEA moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, their main
argument being that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 9 The motion was dismissed and the WVEA's subsequent request to stay
the initiation of discovery was refused. The WVEA took the case before the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upon a petition for writ of prohibition to cease
any further proceedings in the action.' 0
Initially, the court ruled that although extraordinary, prohibition was appropriate in this case because the remedy of appeal was inadequate to guard against
the chilling effect of the litigation on the defendant's right to free speech." This
was true in the instant case because the allegations contained in the complaint were
insufficient to justify an abridgement of speech. Further, the court held that a trial
court must apply a strict standard of review in evaluating defamation actions filed
by public officials or figures when ruling on a motion to dismiss under W. Va.
R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). This standard requires that the complaint on its face allege
facts which adequately support the elements of a defamation action.' 2

The court next addressed the questions of who determines whether statements
are capable of defamatory meaning, and whether they are statements of fact or of

opinion. On both issues, the court reaffirmed that these are questions of law for
the court.'3 Finally, and most importantly, the court subtly refined its definition

I Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 780-81 (W. Va. 1986).
6

Id. at 781.

7Id.

a Id.

9 Id.
Id. "Prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal
possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it has
cognizance or usurping matters not within its jurisdiction to hear or determine." BLACK'S LAw DICnTONARY
1091 (5th ed. 1979).
" Long, 346 S.E.2d at 782.
,2 Id. at 786.
,1Id. at 787.
1o
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of defamation, making it more stringent for public officials, and in doing so held
14
that, as a matter of law, the statements were not defamatory.
III. PRIOR LAW
At common law, statements were actionable for defamation where, from their
plain and ordinary meaning, they tended to injure the reputation of the party, to
throw contumely or to reflect shame and disgrace on the party, or held the party
up as*an object of scorn, ridicule, or contempt.' 5 Such words, when proven published or spoken to a third party, were actionable and damages could be awarded
without any further proof of actual loss. 16 A corollary to this general rule was that
words which imputed that a person was unfit to perform the duties of public office,
or was lacking in integrity sufficient to hold office, were libelous per se. 17 The
statements did not have to imply criminal conduct or even dishonesty, but only a
lack of qualification to hold the office.' 8 The underlying rationale was that public
office holders were more likely to sustain "temporal" damage from such statements
than were others and consequently words not defamatory when directed at nonofficials were often actionable when directed towards public officers. 9 Since the
purpose of this extra protection was to protect the individial in his office, this
liability applied only when the officer held or was about to hold the office. 20 In
West Virginia, these principles were expressed in Sweeney v. Baker.2' In Sweeney,
the Court held that disparaging comments concerning a candidate's moral qualifications to hold office were libelous if proven false, regardless of the speaker's
belief in their accuracy22 However, the court excepted from this general rule comments made concerning a party's physical or mental qualifications for office or any
accurate comments concerning the conduct of the candidatePrior to the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,24 there
were no First Amendment constitutional defenses against a libel action filed by a

14 Id.

'S W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON Tn1 LAW OF TORTS 773 (1984); 12A Mi1cEmS
JUR. Libel and Slander § 2 1978; Colcord v. Gazette Publishing Co., 106 W. Va. 419, 145 S.E. 751
(1928).
26 W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, supra note 15, at 788.
"7Id. at 791; 12A Micms Jim. Libel and Slander § 3.
," 50 AM. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander, § 126 (1970); Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122
F.2d 288 (2nd Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942) (by an equally divided court).
,1 W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, at 791.
2D Id.
21

Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878).

2

Id. at 159, Syl. pt. 9.
Id. at 159-60, Syl. pts. 8, 10.

1 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254.
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public official. 25 There were, however, several exceptions, or qualified privileges,
to this strict liability of defamation carved out by the courts. To receive their benefit,
the defendant was required to prove that the event which triggered the communication was privileged and the communication was made within the scope of the
privilege. 26 Several of these privileges were recognized by the West Virginia court.
One of these privileges was truth. The majority common law rule was that
truth was an absolute defense.27 However, a West Virginia Constitutional provision"
permitted truth as a defense to defamation only when it was also shown that the
publication was made "with good motives and for justifiable ends." Consequently,
in West Virginia, truth was only a qualified privilege.
Another qualified privilege recognized in West Virginia was that of common
interest. This privilege existed where the publisher and the third parties shared a
common interest that was protected or furthered by the defamatory communication.29 This privilege was expressly recognized in Swearingen v. ParkersburgSentinel
Co., 0 where the common interest among taxpayers to discuss the conduct of public
officials and their handling of public monies was upheld.
Foremost among these qualified privileges in the context of defamation of public officials was that of fair comment on public matters. The majority common
law rule held that fair comment and criticism of an official in regard to the handling
of public matters was privileged, as long as the facts upon which the criticisms
were based were accurate." Consequently, misstatements of fact concerning public
officials and public matters were still actionable defamation. West Virginia, however, held the minority view that even misstatements of fact, when given without
malice and in comment about public officials regarding public matters were privileged.32 The rationale behind this rule, as enunciated in Bailey v. Charleston Mail
Association, was that "[a] citizen of a free state having interest in the conduct of
the affairs of his government should not be held to strict accountability for mis-

1 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979). In fact, prior to New York Times Co., the Supreme
Court's only other opportunity to extend such defamation constitutional privilege was Schenectady Union
Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642. There, the defendant was convicted under New York libel law
which was stated by the lower court as follows: "One of [the principles of New York libel law] is that
a false statement need not necessarily charge the violation of any law to be libelous per se; and another
is that, when made of a public official, false accusations which may well lead right-thinking people
to believe him unworthy of public trust and confidence are libelous per se." Sweeney, 122 F.2d 288,
290 (The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by an equally divided court).
Stewart v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S.E. 791 (1934).
27 Note, Havalunch v. Mazza-The Scrambling of Constitutionaland Common Law Defamation
Analysis in West Virginia, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 849, 867 (1982).
W.VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 8.
29 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, at 828 (1984).
10Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943).
"' W. PROSSER & W. YamToN, supra note 15, at 831.
Bailey v. Charleston Mail Assoc., 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
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statement of fact." 33 It is significant to note that while Bailey extended the privilege
of fair comment to misstatements of fact concerning public officials, it did not
appreciably change the definition as to which words constituted actionable defamation. -4 In other words, Bailey did not hold that such statements were no longer
defamatory, but merely privileged their communication. Some 21 years after Bailey,
the United States Supreme Court would cite with approval this reasoning for extending the privilege of fair comment when it extended such comments constitutional
protection.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,35 the United States Supreme Court held
that an action of libel filed by a public official could be maintained only if the
defamatory statements were made with " 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."3 a6 The
New York Times had been convicted of libel under Alabama law which defined
defamation of a public official as being words that "injure him in his public office,
or impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of integrity, or want of fidelity
to a public trust. 37 The Court said, in its now famous passage, that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. '"'s Thus, it alluded that Alabama's definition of defamation
may be too restrictive. However, the Court never expressly overruled this definition
and in fact never reached the question of whether the disputed statements, if uttered
with malice, would have constituted defamation.3 9 In effect, the Court did not rule
that these charges4 were not defamatory, but instead, absent a showing of actual
Id. at 306-07, 27 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 306, 27 S.E.2d at 843-844.
"New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254.

Id. at 279-280.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 270.
" In reviewing Alabama's definition of defamation of a public official, the Court rejected Alabama's test for determining when comments were "of and concerning" an official, but did not scrutinize
the standard of what words are, in themselves, defamatory. Id. at 288. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 78-79 (1964), the Court examined Louisiana's criminal libel statute and struck portions which
punished true statements made with "actual malice" and false statements not made in "reasonable belief"
of their truth rather than the New York Times Co. standard of reckless disregard of the truth. The
Court left intact a provision defining defamation as being "in part anything which tends: (1) To expose
any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or
social intercourse; or... (3) To injure any person or corporation in his or their business or occupation."
Id. at 65, n.l (citing LA. REv. STAT. Tit. 14 § 47 (%Vest 1950).
,oThe charges were leveled in a political advertisement taken out by the Committee to defend
Martin Luther King and the struggle for freedom in the south. The ad stated there existed in the south
an "unprecedented wave of terror" against blacks engaged in non-violent protest. It also charged that
in Montgomery, Alabama truckloads of police armed with shotguns and teargas winged the Alabama
State College campus and that the police padlocked the cafeteria in an attempt to "starve the protesting
students into submission." Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, claimed these charges desparaging the Montgomery Police Department libled him, as it commissioner implicitly. New York Times
Co., 376 U.S. at 256-58.
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malice, they must be extended constitutional protection. 4' Therefore, the primary
focus of the Court in Sullivan was not to redefine defamation but to shelter such
comments when communicated in the legitimate forum of "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open debate of public issues." The recognition of this focus is essential in
trying to maintain the constitutional balance of the competing interests of free
speech and reputation.
The post-Sullivan law of defamation in West Virginia vividly reflects the West
Virginia court's commitment to unfettered free speech. Sprouse v. Clay Communications Co. 42 was the court's first significant opportunity to revisit the law of
defamation of public officials. In Sprouse, the Charleston Daily Mail was accused
of libeling the plaintiff, the Democratic nominee for Governor of West Virginia.
The defendant's news articles themselves, which detailed a series of land sales by
the plaintiff, did not include any misstatements of fact. However, it was alleged
that the headlines, which used phrases like "land grab", "dummy firm", "bonanza" and "clean-up" imputed a lack of integrity in the plaintiff and were purposely used to discredit the plaintiff during his gubenatorial campaign. 43
In its analysis of the case, the court enunciated its test for libel of a public
official:
A candidate for political office is governed by the same rules with regard to recovery
for libel as a public official and can sustain an action for libel only if he can prove
that: (1) the alleged libelous statements were false or misleading; (2) the statements
tended to defame the plaintiff and reflect shame, contumely, and disgrace upon
him; (3) the statements were published with knowledge at the time of publication
that they were false or misleading or were published with a reckless and willful
disregard of truth; and, (4) the publisher intended to injure the plaintiff through
the knowing or reckless publication of the alleged libelous material."

In its evaluation of Sprouse's claim of libel, the court focused almost exclusively
on whether the defendant had published with actual malice. The preliminary question of whether these accusations were in fact defamatory was never fully addressed.
Here, at least, it appears the West Virginia court did not adopt an appreciably
different standard for what is defamatory of a public official relative to what is

4 This constitutional privilege has essentially abrogated and replaced the common
qualified privileges in the contest of public officials. Now any defamation, regardless of
into one of the common law privileges, is protected unless spoken with actual malice.
W. PROSSER & W. KE1roN, supra note 15, at 824-25; Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418

law system of
whether it fits
Id. at 280-81;
U.S. 323, 334

(1974).
42 Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
882 (1975).
41Id. at 433, 211 S.E.2d at 682.
" Id. at 427, Syl. pt.1, 211 S.E.2d at 679, Syl. pt. 1.
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defamatory of a non-official. 45 In essence, the court left undisturbed the Sullivan
mechanism of letting "actual malice" be the primary safeguard of political free
speech.
In the present case, the West Virginia court now appears to have tilted this
balance between the right of reputation and free speech by subtly redefining what
words are defamatory and by emphasizing the court's evaluation of the defamatory
nature of the words as "the critical" threshold issue in a libel action filed by a
public official.4

IV. ANALYSIS
At the beginning of his analysis, Chief Justice Miller addressed the claim fied
under the insulting words statute. 47 The statute, which makes actionable all words
which "tend to violence or breach of peace", specifically states that "no demurrer
shall preclude a jury from passing thereon. '" 41 The court noted that under a previous
decision, 49 the statute was subjected to the same First Amendment defenses as defamation, and consequently this claim is subject to a similar legal analysis. 0
The court next reached the question of whether, under the circumstances of
this case, prohibition would lie after a denial of a motion to dismiss. The Chief
Justice looked to the case of Webb v. Fury" for guidance. In Webb, the court
held that prohibition would lie after the denial of a motion to dismiss when the
ruling "invades the unique constitutional guarantee of the right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances contained in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and where "the remedy of appeal is manifestly inadequate to protect against the chilling effect of allowing a suit to proceed because
the complaint, as a matter of constitutional law, contains insufficient allegations
to warrant an interference with a citizen's right to petition the government." 52 In
finding prohibition appropriate in this case as well, Chief Justice Miller closely
followed the Webb language, and wrote, "prohibition will lie to prohibit a case
from proceeding when the remedy of appeal is manifestly inadequate to protect
against the chilling effect of allowing a suit to proceed because the complaint, as
a matter of constitutional law, contains insufficient allegations to warrant inter-

41The language defining defamation: "the statements tended to.. .reflect shame, contumely, and
disgrace upon him" has been present in some form in West Virginia case law since at least 1928, where
the court so held in Colcord, 106 W. Va. 419, 145 S.E. 751 (1928). Colcord involved a "non-public"

plaintiff.
41 Long, 346 S.E.2d at 786-87.
- W. VA. CODE § 55-7-2 (1981).

sId.
49Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1981).
Long, 346 S.E.2d at 781, n.2.
Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
12 Id. at Syl. pts. 2, 3.
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ference with a citizen's right to free speech under the First Amendment." 53 This
holding, like Webb, implies that under circumstances where the allegations are more
compelling, prohibition may not, however, be an appropriate remedy.
The court next undertook a lengthy analysis of the standard which trial courts
should use in evaluating defamation actions brought by public officials when they
are challenged by a W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)4 motion to dismiss. The court
noted that the normal standard of review under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was
one in which the case would be dismissed only if it appeared "beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief." 55 In rejecting this standard as inappropriate in defamation cases
filed by public officials, the court recognized that a stricter standard of review is
the rule in defamation actions in general, but especially where First Amendment
considerations come into play. 6 The basis of this standard is the court's bias toward
open debate on public issues. 57 The court further buttressed its argument for more
stringent review by firmly re-establishing the principle that appellate courts must
conduct an independant review of the evidence in libel cases to insure that a defendant's First Amendment rights are vindicated." The Chief Justice concluded that
"unless the complaint demonstrated on its face sufficient facts to support the elements of a defamation action, the complaint should be dismissed under W. Va.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."59
Finally, the Court turned to the pivotal question presented in this case. Specifically whether the words contained in the memorandum were, as a matter of
constitutional law, capable of defamatory meaning. The Chief Justice's analysis,
without passing on the question of whether the individual Board members (since
not identified in the statements) had the right to even bring suit, found that the
plaintiffs, as duly elected members of the Cabell County Board of Education, were
in fact public officers in the context of libel law.6 The court next opined its belief
that "the critical issue that must be decided by a court initially is whether the
challenged statements are defamatory.. .because Sullivan accords a higher degree
of protection to criticism of public officials under the First Amendment." 6'
The court, in making this "threshold determination" 62 reexamined the Sprouse
definition of defamation of a public official - "a statement is defamatory if it
13 Long, 346 S.E.2d at 782.
- W. VA. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
55Long, 346 S.E. 2d at 782 (citing Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d

207 (1977)).
16 Id. at 785.
57

Id.

11Id. at 783-84.
5 Id. at 786.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 787.
62

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss2/8

8

Scott: Long v. Egnor: Reexamining the Law of Defamation in the Context o
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

1987]

reflects 'shame, contumely, and disgrace' upon a person." 63 The court implicitly
refined this definition by comparing it to the definition formulated by the California
courts in Okun v. Superior Court 4 The much narrower Okun test holds that "short
of accusations of crime or personal dishonesty, the First Amendment protects even
sharp attacks on the character, motives or moral qualifications of a public officer." 65 The court then applied both the Sprouse and Okun tests to Long's memorandum and found that the allegations in the memorandum were not defamatory
under either test. 6
In a separate analysis of the memorandum's last paragraph, the court found
these statements to be opinions based on the factual allegations contained in the
first paragraph. In this analysis, it was established that the initial determination of
whether allegedly defamatory statements are of fact or opinion, like the question
of whether the statements are in fact defamatory, is one for the court.6 7 In ruling
that all pure statements of opinion are absolutely protected by the First Amendment,
Chief Justice Miller echoed the now famous passage: that "[Uinder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of the other ideas."6' However, the West Virginia court
excepted those opinions which "imply" the allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as their basis from this absolute protection. 69 This exception did not apply
in this case because the facts upon which the opinion was based were expressly set
forth in the memorandum and further, because the facts themselves had been found
non-defamatory. 0 Therefore, since these statements were not, as a matter of constitutional law, capable of defamatory meaning, the writ of prohibition was issued
prohibiting any further prosecution of the action.
The court's analysis in this case emphasizes its commitment to the principle of
free and uninhibited criticism of public officials and their actions taken in their
official capacities. The court's strong commitment to this principle may have caused
it to go too far in protecting such criticism. In Sullivan, the protection was given
by the mechanism of actual malice coupled with a traditional common law definition
of defamation. The West Virginia Court has changed this mechanism by implicitly
redefining what constitutes defamation through its application of the Okun test.
If the application of this test is read as adopting it as definitive of defamation,

Id. (citing Sprouse, 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674).

Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1099, (1981).
1 Id. at 451, 629 P.2d at 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
6 Long, 346 S.E.2d at 787.
67 Id. at 787-88.
14

Long, 346 S.E.2d at 788 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40).
69Id.

70Id.
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now almost any attack on a public official, no matter how vituperate, will be
protected. Consequently, what appears to be a rather easy case, involving rather
tame accusations, may have some significant ramifications.
V.

CONCLUSION

The holding in this case represents a significant shift in the established balance
between a public official's right to reputation and society's interest in free and open
debate on public matters. In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court struck this
balance by extending defamatory comments constitutional protection when uttered
without actual malice. However, the Court protected the official's interest in reputation by leaving intact the common law definition of defamation. This result left
the official only to overcome the actual malice privilege to prevail in a libel action.
In assessing the Sullivan balance of these competing interests, Mr. Justice Powell
has written:
This standard administers an extremely powerful antedote to the inducement to

media self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander.
And it exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to

injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test... [W]e
believe that the New York Times rule states an accomodation between this concern
(media self censorship) and the limited state interest (compensation for wrongful

hurt of one's reputation) in the context of libel actions brought by public persons.7

The West Virginia court seemed to follow this approach in Sprouse, where defamation in the context of public officials continued to be defined in terms familiar
to the West Virginia common law. Now the court may have upset this balance by
placing the extra burden of an elevated standard of defamation on officials. Practically speaking, the court's redefined standard "short of accusations of crime or
personal dishonesty" would essentially foreclose a public official from prevailing
in a libel action. If this standard were closely followed, statements traditionally
actionable as defamatory, such as accusations that the official has become an alcoholic or has contracted some loathsome disease, may now lie in an area of First
Amendment protection.
Borrowing from the words of Mr. Justice Powell, the unavoidable result of
the holding in this case is that many more deserving plaintiffs will be unable to
-surmount the barrier the West Virginia court erects here.
Phillip B. Scott

7,

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43.
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